(6) Great Commanders of the Far East

Ancient East Asia (1100 BC-300 AD)

Jiang Ziya (1100 BC-1030 BC) -

Sun Bin (380 BC-316 BC) -

Bai Qi (320 BC-257 BC) -

Wang Jian (280 BC-220 BC) -

Ying Zheng "Qin Shi Huangdi" (260 BC-210 BC) -

Xiang Yu (232 BC-202 BC) -

Han Xin (230 BC-196 BC) -

Wei Qing (160 BC-106 BC) -

Liu Xiu "Emperor Guangwu" (5 BC-57 AD) -

Ban Chao (32-102) -

Cao Cao (155-220) -

Sima Yi (179-251) -

Zhuge Liang (181-234) -

Sun Ce (175-200) -

Zhou Yu (175-210) - A general which served the Sun house in the state of Wu during the Three Kingdoms. He first served as an officer, administrator and strategist under Sun Jian and his son Sun Ce. Under Sun Quan he was given more commands and took part alongside Cheng Pu in the campaign against Huang Zu (a general under Liu Biao in Jing Province) in 208. In that same year he organized an army of 30,000 men and together with Cheng Pu and their ally Liu Bei they fought the massive naval battle at Chibi (Redcliff), which led to the Han Empire being divided into three states. Afterwards Zhou Yu, Liu Bei and Cheng Pu campaigned against Cao Ren in Jing Province. Zhou Yu died in the year 210 while planning an invasion of Yi Province in the west (controlled by warlord Liu Zhang) and was succeeded in his duties by Lu Su.

Sun Quan (182-252) -

Wang Jun (206-286) -


Imperial East Asia (300-1300)

Huan Wen (312-373) -

Xie Xuan (343-388) - A general of the declining Jin Dynasty after the barbarian invasions which swept northern China. Xie Xuan served under the general Huan Wen and his brother Huan Huo in fighting the state of Former Qin, a state created by sinicized Di people which had conquered the north by the 4th century. With the support of the Jin chancellor Xie An, he was promoted. Organizing a well trained army he relieved the city of Pengcheng in 378. Fu Jian finally carried out a massive invasion of the south which culminated in Xie Xuan's victory against Former Qin at the Fei River (383), he successfully defended the Jin Dynasty and prevented the Di barbarians from conquering the south. Due to this victory and the death of prominent general and lord Huan Chong, Xie Xuan was again promoted. Afterwards he carried out a counterattack against Former Qin as far north as the Yellow River. Then relieved the Former Qin armies, who were under attack in Yecheng by Murong Chui of Later Yan. Further operations were ended as Murong Chui took up a strong position behind the Yellow River, and so Xie Xuan withdrew. Not long after this campaign Xie Xuan fell ill and died.

Liu Yu "Emperor Wu" (363-422)

Gwanggaeto (374-413)

Yang Jian "Emperor Wen" (541-604)

Li Shimin "Emperor Taizong" (598-649)

Li Jing (571-649)

Li Shiji (594-669)

Su Dingfang (591-667)

Xue Rengui (614-683)

Guo Ziyi (697-781)

Abaoji "Emperor Taizu" (872-926)

Zhao Kuangyin "Emperor Taizu" (927-976)

Wanyan Aguda "Emperor Taizu" (1068-1123)

Yue Fei (1103-1142)

Genghis Khan (1162-1227)

Mukhali (1170-1223)

Subutai (1175-1248)

Batu Khan (1207-1255)

Kublai Khan "Emperor Shizu" (1215-1294)

Tran Hung Dao (1228-1300)


Early Modern East Asia (1300 - 1800)

Zhu Yuanzhang "Hongwu Emperor" (1328-1398)

Fu Youde (1327-1394)

Feng Sheng (1330-1395)

Xu Da (1332-1385)

Lan Yu (1330-1393)

Mu Ying (1345-1392)

Zhu Di "Yongle Emperor" (1360-1424)

Zheng He (1371-1435)

Qi Jiguang (1528-1588)

Li Chengliang (1526-1618)

Konishi Yukinaga (1555-1600)

Kwon Yul (1537-1599)

Yi Sun Sin (1545-1598)

Bayinnaung (1516-1581)

Naresuan (1555-1605)

Nurhachi (1559-1626)

Dorgon (1612-1650)

Zheng Chenggong (1624-1662)

Aisin Gioro Xuanye "Kangxi Emperor" (1654-1722)

Alaungpaya (1714-1760)

Zhao Hui (1708-1764)

Fukanggan (1753-1796)


Japanese Feudal Era (500-1800)

Taira Tomomori (1152-1185) -

Minamoto Yoshitsune (1159-1189) -

Mori Motonari (1497-1571) -

Takeda Shingen (1521-1573) -

Uesugi Kenshin (1530-1578) -

Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) -

Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598) -

Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616) -

Kuki Yoshitaka (1542-1600) -

Shimazu Yoshihiro (1535-1619) -

(5) Great Commanders of the Late Modern Era

First World War & Communist Revolution (1900-1924)

Edmund Allenby (1861-1936) -

John Jellicoe (1859-1935) -

Radomir Putnik (1847-1917) -

Joseph Gallieni (1849-1916) -

Louis Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934) -

Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929) -

Philippe Petain (1856-1951) -

August von Mackensen (1849-1945) -

Erich von Falkenhayn (1861-1922) -

Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937) -

Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870-1964) -

Reinhard Scheer (1863-1928) -

Franz von Hipper (1863-1932) -

Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) -

Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935) -

Mikhail Frunze (1885-1925) -


Interwar and Second World War (1924-1945)

Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (1867-1951)

Rodolfo Graziani (1882-1955)

Adolf Hitler (1889-1945)

Gunther von Kluge (1882-1944) - Originally a staff officer during the First World War, he was promoted to field commands in the interwar period. During the Second World War he gained experience in Army commands and then finally Army Group command, which gave him an advantage over many contemporaries. He commanded 4th Army in northern Poland (under Bock), 4th Army as part of the central thrust in France (under Rundstedt) and 4th Army as part of the central attack in Russia and in the Battle of Moscow (again under Bock). At the end of 1941 he replaced Bock as commander of Army Group Center. Largely he had commanded the bloody defensive operations of Army Group Center from the very end of 1941 until 1944. Even carrying out strategic withdrawals such as Operation Buffel. He was also in command of one of the Army Groups in Operation Citadel, along the northern sector of the Kursk salient which included Orel. After Rundstedt had failed to defend Normandy, he was replaced by Gunther von Kluge. Generally being more competent than his predecessors, he was nonetheless unable to hold the line, no counter offensive succeeded, and was forced to withdraw towards the Seine and Loire rivers. On 19 August he drank cyanide either for fear of implication in the Bomb Plot or for fear of being defeated in France.

Albert Kesselring (1885-1960) -

Erwin Rommel (1891-1944) -

Erich von Manstein (1887-1973) -

Karl Doenitz (1891-1980) -

Walter Model (1891-1945) -

Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) -

Aleksander Vasilevsky (1895-1977) -

Georgy Zhukov (1896-1974) -

Konstantin Rokossovsky (1896-1968) -

Nikolai Vatutin (1901-1944)

Andrew Cunningham (1883-1963)

George S. Patton (1885-1945)

Bernard Montgomery (1887-1976)

William Slim (1891-1970)

Chester Nimitz (1885-1966)

Shunroku Hata (1879-1962)

Hisaichi Terauchi (1879-1946)

Isoroku Yamamoto (1884-1943)

Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885-1946)

Shojiro Iida (1888-1980)

Jiang Jieshi (1887-1975)


Cold War & Fall of Empires (1945-1991)

Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) -

Lin Biao (1907-1971) -

Vo Nguyen Giap (1911-2013) -

Sam Hormusji Manekshaw (1914-2008) -

Norman Schwarzkopf (1934-2012) -

(4) Great Commanders of the Early Modern Era

Enlightenment Era (1700-1792)

Baji Rao (1700-1740)

John Churchill duke of Marlborough (1650-1722)

Eugene de Savoie (1663-1736)

Claude de Villars (1653-1734)

Peter the Great (1672-1725)

Charles XII of Sweden (1682-1718)

Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750)

Frederick II the Great (1712-1786)

Leopold Joseph von Daun (1705-1766)

Ernst Gideon von Laudon (1717-1790)

Ferdinand of Brunswick (1721-1792)

Edward Hawke (1705-1781)

Nader Shah (1698-1747)

Ahmad Khan Abdali (1722-1772)

George Washington (1731-1799)

George Rodney (1718-1792)

Pierre Andre de Suffren (1729-1788)

Alexander Suvorov (1730-1800)

Fyodor Ushakov (1745-1817)

Tipu Sultan (1750-1799)


Napoleonic Wars & Age of Revolution (1792-1848)

Dmitry Senyavin (1763-1831)

Mikhail Barclay de Tolly (1761-1818) - A prominent Russian commander due to his campaigns in Finland (1808/09), Russia (1812), Poland and Germany (1813) and France (1814). Initially an officer serving against the Turks (1787-1792), Swedes (1788-1790), in Poland (1794) and finally against the French during the Fourth Coalition (1806-1807). He became the driving force behind the Russian military reforms after 1808 (during which he commanded the war against Sweden) and the key Russian commander in opposing Napoleon for most of 1812. He then succeeded Milkhail Kutuzov in directing the Russian effort from April 1813, as well as in 1814 and 1815.

Gebhard Leberecht von Blucher (1742-1819)

Horatio Nelson (1758-1805)

Arthur Wellesley (1769-1852)

Andre Massena (1758-1817)

Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult (1769-1851)

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) - 

Louis Gabriel Suchet (1770-1826)

Louis Nicolas Davout (1770-1823)

Karl von Osterreich-Teschen (1771-1847)

Joseph Radetzky von Radetz (1766-1858)

Jose de San Martin (1778-1850)

Simon Bolivar (1783-1830)

Theodoros Kolokotronis (1770-1843)

Ibrahim Pasha (1789-1848)

Shaka Zulu (1787-1828)

Zachary Taylor (1784-1850)

Winfield Scott (1786-1866)


Nationalism, Colonialism & the Industrial Era (1848-1900)

Omar Pasha (1806-1871)

Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891)

Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882)

Patrice de MacMahon (1808-1893)

Louis Faidherbe (1818-1889)

Amedee Courbet (1827-1885)

Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri (1808-1883)

Ivan Paskevich (1782-1856)

Konstantin von Kaufman (1818-1882)

Robert E. Lee (1807-1870)

Ulysses Grant (1822-1885)

William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891)

David Farragut (1801-1870)

William Thomas Sampson (1840-1902)

Manuel Baquedano (1823-1897)

Saigo Takamori (1828-1877)

Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) - An officer from Choshu who fought during the Boshin "Revolution" (1868-1869). He was instrumental in building the Imperial Japanese Army, after the civil war, and developing Japanese military doctrine and strategy. He was one of the generals which suppressed the Satsuma Rebellion (1877) and served in multiple positions including War Minister. He commanded the First Army in Korea during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) until December of 1894 after he crossed the Yalu River into Manchuria. He came down with an illness and had to return to Japan. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) he played a key organizational and strategic role as Chief of General Staff.


Oyama Iwao (1842-1916)

Togo Heihachiro (1848-1934)

Charles John Napier (1786-1860)

James Bremer (1786-1850)

Hugh Gough (1779-1869)

Garnet Wolseley (1833-1913)

Frederick Roberts (1832-1914) 

Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916)

(3) Great Commanders of the Middle Ages

Dark Ages (480 AD-700 AD)

Clovis (466-511) -

Flavius Belisarius (505-565) -

Narses (478-573) -

Flavius Heraclius (575-641) -

Muhammad ibn Abdullah (570-632) -

Khalid ibn al-Walid (585-642) -

Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan (602-680) -


Early Medieval Period (700-1000)

Charles Martel (686-741)

Pepin the Younger (714-768)

Charles the Great (742-814)

Krum the Fearsome (760-814)

Abu Muslim Khorasani (718-755)

Harun al-Rashid (763-809)

Tahir ibn Husayn "al-A 'war" (775-822)

Alfred the Great (849-899)

Simeon the Great (864-927)

Otto the Great (912-973)

Brian Boru (941-1014)

Basil the Bulgar Slayer (958-1025)

Mahmud of Ghazni (971-1030)

Tughril (990-1063)


High Medieval Period (1000-1250)

Canute the Great (995-1035) -

Robert Guiscard (1015-1085) -

William the Conqueror (1028-1087) -

Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar (1043-1099) -

Henry I of England (1068-1135) - One of the sons of William the Conqueror, he had two older brothers. William II succeeded as King of England and Robert II succeeded as Duke of Normandy. Henry was given no lands and so he purchased the County of Cotentin. In 1088 Normandy was in chaos and King William II and Duke Robert II were in conflict, many barons in Normandy and England also rebelled. Henry was arrested by his brother Robert but later set free. In 1090 he supported Robert against rebellious lords in Normandy and saved his castle of Rouen from these rebels. In 1091 William II invaded Normandy and forced his brother Robert to negotiate. Duke Robert was paranoid and banished his younger brother Henry. In the same year William II and Robert II declared war on their brother Henry and besieged him at Mont Saint-Michel, he surrendered and fled into France. Henry planned to overthrow Robert and take Normandy and in 1094 William II invaded Normandy again, Henry went to London. William's campaign ended in failure but Henry was gaining support from barons and was now loyal to William. Together they campaigned in Vexin in 1097 and 1098. King William II died in a hunting accident in 1100 and since Robert was on Crusade in Jerusalem it was Henry who took the throne of England as King Henry II. In 1101 Robert invaded England for the throne, many barons joined him. Henry II maneuvered and intercepted them at Alton and they made peace. Then in 1102 Henry II purged the barons which were not loyal to him, some rebelled and he took their castles of Arundel, Tickhill, Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth. Normandy was still in chaos so Henry II invaded in 1105, he defeated his brother Robert at Tinchebray in 1106. In 1113 Henry II supported his nephew Theobald II de Blois against rebel barons. In 1108 and 1114 he carried out campaigns in Wales. A revolt broke out in Alencon in 1118 and when Henry went to put them down he was defeated by count Fulk V of Anjou. In 1119 he took Breteuil from his son-in-law Eustace. Then made an alliance with Fulk V of Anjou. In Vexin he defeated the army of King Louis VI of France and Robert's son William Clito. In 1120 his son William Adelin drowned at sea and caused a succession crisis. Fulk V of Anjou turned on Henry once again and supported William Clito. In 1123 Henry besieged the rebels in Normandy and fought them at Bourgtheroulde where he captured them in 1124. To prevent the French from supporting the rebels, he had his son-in-law Emperor Henry V lead a campaign from the east. Emperor Henry V died in 1125 and needing a successor he had his daughter Matilda remarry count Geoffrey V of Anjou in 1127. In 1135 Geoffrey V and Matilda supported a revolt in Normandy so Henry campaigned against them, he fell ill and died at the end of the year. His nephew Stephen de Blois claimed the throne of England and began a war with Matilda and Geoffrey V of Anjou. Eventually Henry's grandson Henry II, the son of Geoffrey V and Matilda, would become king.

Frederick I Barbarossa (1122-1190) -

Henry II of England (1133-1189) - Perhaps the most prestigious of the Plantagenets, he ruled an empire in all but name. His campaigns extended into Scotland, Wales and Ireland. At the start of his reign as Duke of Anjou and Normandy he was required to press the claim of his mother, Empress Matilda, in order to take the throne of England. This he managed to do militarily by defeating the enemy of his mother King Stephen (son of Adela of Normandy). Although the war was unpopular amongst the clergy and nobility, and so a peace was negotiated, Stephen's son died and the succession passed on to Henry. His real claim to fame was the defeat of the Great Revolt of 1173. He defeated his three sons Henry, Richard and Geoffrey as well as Louis VII of France. The rebels and their allies were defeated in Northumbria, East Anglia and Normandy. His final campaign against his rebellious son Richard and Philip II of France came at the very end of his reign, in which he acceded to Richard's demands and died within a few days. At the time there was an interest among the rulers of Europe to go on Crusade, what the Third Crusade would have been like under Henry is unknown but would have been interesting.

Nur ad-Din Zangi (1118-1174) -

Salah ad-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub (1138-1193) -

Richard the Lion Heart (1157-1199) -


Late Medieval Period (1250-1490)

Baibars (1223-1277) -

Ruggiero di Lauria (1245-1305) -

Edward I Longshanks (1239-1307) -

Robert I de Brus (1274-1329) -

Vettor Pisani (1324-1380) -

Edward III of England (1312-1377) -

Edward the Black Prince (1330-1376) -

Bertrand du Guesclin (1320-1380) -

Nuno Alvares Pereira (1360-1431) -

Timur (1330-1405) -

Jan Zizka (1360-1424) -

Francesco Bussone da Carmagnola (1382-1432) -

Henry V of England (1386-1422) -

Joan of Arc (1412-1431) -

Edward IV of England (1442-1483) -

Gjergj Kastrioti Skanderbeg (1405-1468) -

Janos Hunyadi (1406-1456) -

Stefan III Cel Mare (1433-1504) -

Murad II (1404-1451) -

Mehmed II (1432-1481) -

Saladin the Strategist: An Underappreciated Commander

"Salah ad-Din" Yusuf ibn Ayyub, Sultan of Egypt and Syria 

Was it strong and grizzled knights with combat experience what dominated Medieval wars or was it their skilled commanders? It could be that the two were indistinguishable in the Medieval period. At least in the cases of Saladin he was a more scholarly and strategically minded commander with a skill for organization. Even so he comes off in the historiography as a very underappreciated commander. More focus is given to his crusader opponents. Despite Frederick Barbarossa's victories against rebellious lords in Germany or against the forces of the Duchies in Poland, the city-states of Italy, the Byzantines and the Anatolian Turks he suffered crippling defeats in Italy proper given the fact that he was forced into protracted conflict. Barbarossa was only able to salvage the situation and reclaim territory using diplomacy. Richard the Lionheart as well was unable to seize significant territory in France. During the crusades he won notable tactical victories over Saladin in the Holy Land but failed utterly in his goal to take Jerusalem. This was despite having a significant advantage in troops over Saladin, with regards to quality and possibly quantity. 

Saladin was not an incompetent military commander, as one might claim from solely a focus on tactical engagements such as at Montgisard, Tyre, Acre, Arsuf and Jaffa.
Strategically he was an extremely skilled commander, due to his strategies he was able to wipe out Guy de Lusignan's army at Hattin. Tactical ability was not a huge factor in this campaign since the Crusaders were hungry, thirsty, demoralized and suffering from extreme heat. This campaign led to his besieging and taking Jerusalem without opposition from any force in the field.
His strategy at Arsuf would also have provided him with a very high chance of winning the battle of Arsuf, despite the fact that he ultimately lost that battle tactically. Saladin's battle plan at Arsuf was quite ingenious and involved drawing Richard in through skirmishing and harassing with mounted archers and light infantry. Ultimately this plan failed because Richard noticed and exploited the flaw in his plan. Namely that Richard did not permit himself to be drawn in a charge and open his flanks to encirclement. Then Saladin's army went against the plan and tried to charge Richard's defensive square formation, playing into Richard's hands and being defeated in combat. Thus Saladin lost the major engagement of the Third Crusade. For this reason Saladin changed focus to strategic containment and a flexible defense, carried out through maneuver.

Saladin's strategies and flexibility outside of the battlefield prevented Richard from reaching Jerusalem. Saladin used scorched earth and harassment to subvert Richard's march and force him to retreat towards the coastline. Generally Saladin's priority being placed on the overall strategic objective allowed him to achieve success on his campaigns. It cannot be denied that he lost battles and some could be seen as being quite embarrassing but the truth is he won a fair share of battles as wells. More importantly though he succeeded in conquering and ruling Egypt and expanding his territory into every direction. Even if he wasn't a tactical mastermind that doesn't make his strategic, logistical, organizational or operational skill any worse. For instance his serving as chancellor for the defeated Fatimid Caliph in Egypt and then gradually expanding his power to the point that he could dethrone this Caliph and crown himself Sultan of Egypt. These actions also allowed him to remove himself from Nur ad-Din's rule and gain favour with the Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad by supplanting the Shia rule in Egypt. More impressive was his capitalizing on the death of his former lord Nur ad-Din Zengi to invade that ruler's territory in Syria and Upper Mesopotamia. He did this systematically and methodically, chipping away at Zengid territories and using both military force, diplomacy and political scheming carried out from an understanding of feudal politics within Islamdom and the tribal politics of the various peoples of the region. By seizing control of Egypt and Syria he was able to take control of key trade routes, conquer key territories within the Middle East as well as attack the Kingdom of Jerusalem from two sides. Therefore Saladin's career could be divided into three periods: his conquest of Egypt and his consolidation as a ruler, his expansion into Syria and the removal of the Zengids and his legitimization of his position within Islam by conquering Jerusalem. At the time of his death Saladin was perhaps the most powerful and prestigious ruler within Islam.

But the main reason for why Saladin lost in those battles was perhaps one in the same as the reason he succeeded as a conqueror. This was because of his means and method. Namely it was due to the feudal Turkic nature of his military force. The composition of his armies being a wide range of light cavalry and infantry and slightly heavier infantry. Due to these reasons Saladin's tactical options were quite limited when faced with opponents such as the Crusader states which could field extremely powerful heavy knights that essentially melted the majority of units in Saladin's army in close combat. However due to the light composition of Saladin's army this gave him a huge strategic advantage against the Crusader states which was a far more mobile force in the terrain of the Middle East with a wide array of flexibility as well as operational and strategic options. Saladin's army could not even compare to the Crusader armies since in terms of training his troops he would be at a disadvantage, though this is not to say that most of his soldiers were not professional soldiers. As Saladin's army was mostly made up of Kurdish and Turkish mercenaries (which were reorganized into feudal formations) as well as Mameluke slave soldiers and then filling up the ranks with Arab recruits (both professional soldiers and militias). The Arabic troops however were considered to be rather poorly equipped and of poor quality and mostly used for garrisoning cities or as light infantry. As the armies of the area were dominated by Turkish troops and doctrines. In terms of armaments his mostly Turco-Kurdish force was still at a disadvantage as they lacked the strong armour and complex equipment such as the Arbalest. In fact Saladin opted to purchase equipment from Frankish merchants when he had the chance. The whole of his campaign plans hinged on quickly raising a large force (his army having a core of elite veterans and filled up with weaker infantry and cavalry through feudal and militia levies) and moving rapidly through the terrain to attack a city or army at a strategic disadvantage. As his army could maneuver to create for these strategic options and avoid the weaknesses which affected the Crusader armies in this terrain. He was rather successful and led to many armies being caught off guard or encircled (Hattin, Arsuf, multiple battles against the Zengid Emirs). 

Saladin experienced large amounts of success against the Zengids despite many cities being able to hold out in long sieges. Compared to the rather logistically strained Crusader armies which were limited to traveling along the coast and only moving in rough terrain from one source of water to the other. Certainly the Crusaders had to travel on a north to south axis due to the geographic position and topography of their states. But very rarely did the Crusader armies successfully invade Syria or broke out of Palestine. The Second Crusade was an utter failure when it came to capturing Damascus. Even during the First Crusade the Crusader armies were starving as they traveled through Anatolia and of course famous examples such as the Crusader defeats at the hands of Nur ad-Din Zengi at Bosra, Damascus, Inab and Aintab (in Syria) and at the hands of Saladin at al-Babein, Marj Ayyun, Jacob's Ford and Hattin (despite the fact that Hattin was within their own territory inside of Palestine near the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan River). Saladin knew this and exploited it and achieved operational and strategic victories. When it comes to Saladin he and his army were not limited to campaigning within Palestine and Jordan as his military operations also ranged to Syria, Egypt, North Africa, Northern Iraq and Arabia. That is what Middle Eastern armies of the time were for, rather than campaigning against European castles littered across a small area.

He was clearly capable in maneuvering his troops and defeating his enemies operationally. The simple fact is that the average Turco-Kurdish feudal soldier was no match against the average knight; in battle Saladin was always at a disadvantage against them even if he could bring numerical superiority to bear. Judging by the First Crusade and its aftermath or the other battles of the Third Crusade where Saladin did not take part and it appears very much the same. The Crusaders were unbeatable juggernauts compared to the Middle Eastern armies. The strategic realities of the time in the Crusader States against Muslim Emirates was tactically different but strategically similar from an Emir against another Emir scenario.
If anything the fact that Saladin recognized these defects and worked within his strategic limitations, as well as his accomplishments, proves that he was quite good.

There are different types of military commanders and not all of them are best suited to front line command or fighting battles. 
Most would agree that Saladin was not a military commander such as King Richard, who led his troops into battle, Saladin was more the chess player who orchestrated large scale strokes. But that aside a handful of battles are not enough to say that a commander is a failure. The expansion of his realm and ultimate success shows quite the opposite. Even if a particular tactical engagement showed a commander's limitations that does not mean that they would not improve or learn from their mistakes. The Battle of Montgisard in itself, fought against King Baldwin the Leper, was the result of Saladin's baggage train being bogged down and then his army being taken completely by surprise. Had Saladin's army been in a compact formation there is nothing that Baldwin could have done but due to the circumstances there is very little which Saladin could have done save for abandoning his baggage train and retreating or trying to protect the baggage train, there were no other options under those circumstances. Even in that case Saladin moved forward on his horse and attempted to reorganize his formations mid-battle, to create a front line against the attacking forces of King Baldwin.

The concept was mostly that of maneuverability on and off the field of battle and had lots of emphasis on projectile weapons such as arrows and javelins. Tactics such as those used at Arsuf were tried and tested methods which Saladin used before (however most of his tactics seem more in line with Hattin, that is to say indirect and unorthodox) and which the local Emirs had employed successfully against the Crusaders (such as Nur ad-Din Zengi). Technically Saladin had the advantage that he had more control over his forces and vassals as compared to the rather less cohesive forces of Jerusalem and the Crusaders. Saladin increased the size of his coffers and army meaning that he could train his forces over time and had a very good core of troops. Saladin also tried to follow European standards of armaments and armour to make heavier troops and equip them with things such as crossbows. That said their cavalry definitely lacked the powerful punch of Knights and were mostly used to attack a flank (usually attacking the enemy's left flank) but not before trying to wear down the enemy with projectiles so that they would crumble before the cavalry charge.

Usually Saladin employed two main commanders to lead his troops in battle (though he had many others): his nephew Taqi al-Din (son of his deceased eldest brother Nur ad-Din Ayyub) and his Kurdish general Gokbori, both of which were known for being highly aggressive field commanders. The most aggressive commanders were given control of the right flank as traditionally the right flank was used on the attack, while the left flank defended and the center provided support. Taqi ad-Din had been sent on campaigns into Cyrenaica, Libya and Tunisia. Gokbori for his part was also made governor over various areas in Syria and Iraq and even campaigned against the Zengids in the area of the Upper Euphrates. Saladin's older brother Turanshah was also a notable commander in his own right and Saladin had sent him off to campaign in Nubia, Tunis, Hejaz and Yemen. It is true that Nur ad-Din had sent Turanshah to Egypt to oversee Saladin's actions and in the hope that they would fight a civil war between them. Instead Saladin rewarded his older brother with a large fief and as Saladin was the main administrator and planner Turanshah did not contest his brother's rule. Turanshah went on to serve as a capable governor in Egypt, Yemen and Syria (he would die in 1181). Saladin's younger brother Sayf ad-Din was also capable. Sayf ad-Din had served his brother Saladin as a logistics officer, administrator and governor in Aleppo. Taking advantage of both feudal and Islamic politics he succeeded in overthrowing Saladin's son and grandson in Syria and then Egypt respectively. Sayf ad-Din also had to put down an attempt by the Zengids to restore their realm.

Indeed this family was essentially a military family of the time. Their father Ayyub and uncle Shirkuh had served Nur ad-Din Zengi and his father Imad ad-Din Zengi. Ayyub had been governor of Tikrit under Emir Shadhi and when he took up service with Imad ad-Din he was made a commander in the Zengid army. He commanded the rear guard in a battle against the Seljuks at Tikrit, thereby allowing Imad ad-Din and Nur ad-Din to retreat and saving their lives. He was then made governor of Baalbek and briefly defended that city before surrendering it to the Burid emirs of Damascus. Both Ayyub and Shirkuh negotiated the capture of Damascus from the Burids and Ayyub was made that city's governor. Later when Saladin and his uncle Shirkuh had conquered Egypt and Saladin made himself the vizier there, Ayyub joined him and was given Alexandria, Damietta and Damanhur as his fief. Being ethnically Kurdish and raised among Turks, Saladin was exposed to the warrior cultures of the Middle East. He developed his military abilities from his family and when on campaign with his uncle Shirkuh. However Saladin also displayed scholarly interests which both translated into his administrative and strategic ability. He was also said to have an inherent cunning to his character and this was noticed by Nur ad-Din who attempted to curb Saladin's growing power and thereby the influence of the Ayyubid family as well. 

It is interesting to note that Saladin has been remembered within Islamic historiography as more of a trickster than a warrior. No doubt this impression comes from the manner by which he seized power in Egypt and for his turning against his Zengid overlords, ultimately overthrowing them. He was also ignored in favour of the more successful Rukn al-Din Baibars who defeated the declining Crusader states and defended Palestine from the Mongols at Ain Jalut in 1260. It is true that Saladin retook Jerusalem but his inability to reclaim the coastal cities was seen as a failure on his part by other Muslims. Regardless he became the foremost Islamic leader of his times and he did so as an officer in his uncle Shirkuh's campaign against the Crusaders, Byzantines and Fatimids in Egypt. By the end of his life he had conquered Egypt, Syria and Northern Iraq. His territories stretched as far west as Kairouan in Tunisia, as far south as Nubia and Yemen, as far north as Khartabirt on the far reaches of the Upper Euphrates and as far east as Irbil in Kurdistan. He had also conquered Jerusalem and Latakia from the Crusaders. In addition to this he had gained the political support from the theocratic Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad and had made alliances and received tribute from the Seljuq Sultan of Rum and the Ortuqid beys of Diyarbekir, while also coming to an agreement with Emperor Isaac II of Constantinople. His dynasty persisted in its control of the Middle East until 1260, the Mameluke usurpers continued this state until 1517. Saladin's empire and successor state being only supplanted by another Turkish power which had learned the methods of gunpowder warfare (the Ottomans).